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I. INTRODUCTION
Within nation states, governments typically are given the authority
to establish the rules and other institutions that allow individuals to
engage in market exchange. These rules and institutions govern con-
tracts, property rights, and a host of other factors concerning which
agreement must exist if markets are to function at all. Similar institu-
tions are needed at the international level in order to realize the gains
from trade that form such an essential component of the pure theory
of international trade. In this case, however, there is no international
Senior authorship not assigned. Paper presented at the Regional International
Conference on "International Trade at the Crossroads: The Role of International
Law and International Institutions in Regulating Trade in the Post-Uruguay
Round Era," University of Nebraska College of Law, Lincoln, October 11-13,1991.
The authors wish to acknowledge helpful comments on an earlier draft of this
paper made by Professor Bob McGeorge, University of Nebraska College of Law,
John Head, Kansas University Law School; and Dale Anderson, Dept. of Agricul-
tural Economics, University of Nebraska.
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state that can be charged with establishing and enforcing these rules.'
Since World War II, international trade has been regulated by the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), a voluntary treaty
organization that includes most of the world's trading nations.2
The GATT is extremely important for world trade. Since its for-
mation in 1947, the world community has been able to use the GAT
framework to negotiate tariff reductions, from an average of about 40
percent to as low as 5 percent today, in most industrialized countries.3
Even though these reductions in tariffs primarily have affected manu-
factures, the GATT also serves as a forum for dealing with non-tradi-
tional international trade issues including services trade, intellectual
property rights and agriculture.4 With the radical political and eco-
nomic changes occurring in Eastern Europe and the former USSR, the
world community may be moving toward a brand of globalism that
involves greater interaction than embodied in our current multilateral
concepts of international relations.5 In this context, an organization
such as the GATT is essential to establish and enforce rules regulating
a particular set of these economic and political interactions.
However, the GATT is presently under attack as a result of the
difficulties encountered in reaching agreement on a number of
problems-notably those related to agricultural trade-during the
current Uruguay Round of trade negotiations s The conflicts and diffi-
1. Charles P. Kindleberger, International Public Goods Without International Gov-
ernent, 76 AM. ECON. REv. 1 (1986).
2. The GAIT was formed in 1947. Ninety-three countries are full signatories and
about 122 countries follow the GAIT rules in principle and receive GATT treat-
ment from the signatories. About 80 percent of the world's trade is affected by
the GATT rules. WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1987, at 156
(1987).
3. Id.
4. See generally THE URUGUAY ROUND: A HANDBOOK ON THE MULTILATERAL TRADE
NEGOTIATIONS (J. Michael Finger & Andrze Olechowski, eds., 1987)[hereinafter
URUGUAY ROUND].
5. THE GROWTH OF REGIONAL TRAD NG BLOCS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (Richard S.
Belous & Rebecca S. Hartley, eds., 1990)[hereinafter REGIONAL TRADING BLOCS].
The term 'globalism' is often used in reference to the GATT and its guid-
ing philosophies. But, although the GAIT has well over 100 contracting
parties and associated countries, it still does not include a significant
number of nations with centrally planned economies. It also does not
provide rules for the regulation of many areas of trade undertaken by
the contracting parties. Thus, the GATT is a multilateral rather than a
global trading system, even though its members and associates conduct
over four-fifths of total world trade.
Id at 2.
6. DALE HATHAWAY, AGRICULTURE AND THE GATT: REWRITIG THE RULES (1987)
From their inception, the international trade rules relating to agricul-
ture have been adjusted to fit the different national programs designed
to protect farmers. Agriculture has been treated differently from other
industries in the rules developed by the member nations of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and many of the trade prac-
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culties that have arisen during these negotiations have made the
GATT process seem cumbersome and subject to stalemate. In ques-
tioning the efficacy of the GATT multilateral approach to interna-
tional institutions, some have argued that regional or bilateral
agreements effectively can substitute for multilateral agreements and
are easier to negotiate.7
The purpose of this article is to argue that the multilateral frame-
work offered by the GATT is preferable to alternative approaches to
the creation of international institutions for promoting world trade.
Multilateral economic arrangements such as the GATT have as their
object and purpose a vision of a peaceful world.8 But such a vision has
not been exploited to mobilize domestic and international consensus
on negotiated agreements. 9 If the institutional objective of the GATT
is seen as a contribution to world peace, a smoothly-functioning world
trade regime becomes a means to an end rather than merely an end in
itself. To provide operational force to this institutional objective, we
examine critically the historical origins, intent and purpose of the
GATT arrangement, focusing particularly on its "peace-keeping"
goals. We argue that "non-substantive" concepts-such as good faith,
sympathetic consideration, reasonableness, best efforts and the like
which play an important and constructive role in the coordination of
tices common in agriculture have never had any effective rules applied
to them.
Id. at 1.
7. MIRAM CAmps & WaiAM DIEBOLD, JR., THE NEW MULTILATERALISM: CAN THE
WORLD TRADING SYSTEM BE SAVED? (1983)
It is not just a matter of strengthening GATT or applying its principles
more vigorously, although that would be very helpful and might be es-
sential. What we called for were quite a few changes in the international
system. We asked whether bilateral negotiations (which we labelled se-
lective action), or perhaps plurilateral arrangements, might be the way
to reform, rebuild, and extend the multilateral system.
Id at 181. See also Bruce Stokes, GAYT Gathering, 18 NAT'L J. 2059 (1986)("The
postwar obligation to seek multilateral consensus on trade rules is outdated, and
bilateral agreements and understanding among like-minded nations are the wave
of the future"). For a more recent discussion, see REGIONAL TRADING BLOCS,
supra note 5.
8. Jean Kyongun Koh, Reservations to Multilateral Treaties: How International
Legal Doctrine Reflects World Vision, 23 HARv. INT. L.J. 71 (1982). 'Visions of
the world are general pictures of international life." Id. at 71, n.4.
9. CORDELL HuLL, THE MEMOms OF CORDELL HULL 358 (1948)
It has been my experience in Congress and in the State Department that
the general public grasps with much more ease and interest many of the
broad political actions of our government in foreign affairs than it does
the economic actions. It is not too difficult to understand the meaning of
a diplomatic protest, a political treaty, the withdrawal of an ambassador,
or the recognition of a new government. It is indeed difficult to under-
stand the interaction of foreign commerce, tariffs, currency exchange
and debts.
[hereinafter MEMOIRS].
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domestic markets-are also important in promoting the coordination
and peace-keeping goals of the GATT.
This article is organized into four parts. In Part II, we describe and
document the contribution of the GATT to world trade, highlighting
(a) the peace-keeping role, and (b) forces tending to undermine that
role. Part III discusses the implications of such alternatives to the
GATT system as regional and bilateral arrangements. Part IV devel-
ops the concept of non-substantive clauses, particularly the concept of
good faith as a mechanism for assuring compliance with international
institutions in the context of the vision of a peaceful world offered by
the GATT multilateral process. Conclusions are presented in Part V.
II. CONTRIBUTION OF THE GATT TO WORLD TRADE
A. The Peace-keeping Role of the GATT
The view that a harmonious world trade regime would lead to a
peaceful world has a long intellectual history.0 John Stuart Mill best
captured the spirit of this rich history:
It is commerce which is rapidly rendering war obsolete, by strengthening and
multiplying the personal interests which are in natural opposition to it. And it
may be said without exaggeration, that the great extent and rapid increase of
international trade, in being the principal guarantee of the peace of the world,
is the great permanent security for the uninterrupted progress of the ideas,
the institutions, and the character of the human race. 1
The extensive literature on the question of worldwide economic re-
construction after World War II reveals that the planners of the vari-
ous Bretton Woods Institutions, including the GATT, were influenced
heavily by the intellectual history that recognized a harmonious trade
regime as a condition for world peace.12 The drafters were practical
10. For a useful discussion of this theme see Fabricius, The Universal and Regional
Harmonisation of International Trade Law as a Means of Maintaining World
Peace, in INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND TRADE LAw 201 (Clive Schmittoff &
Kenneth Simmonds, eds., 1976).
11. Id. at 206.
12. The post-war literature on the relationship between a harmonious trade regime
and world peace is extensive. The following observation by Cordell Hull summa-
rizes the thrust of the argument during the period:
Economic warfare results in a lowering of hiring standards throughout
the world. It foments [sic] internal strife. It offers constant temptation
to use force, or threat of force, to obtain what could have been got
through normal processes of trade. A people driven to desperation by
unemployment, want, and misery is a constant threat of disorder and
chaos, both internal and external. It falls an easy prey to dictators and
desperadoes. In so far as we make it easier for ourselves and every one
else to live, we diminish the pressure on any country to seek economic
betterment through war. The basic approach to the problem of peace is
the ordering of the world's economic life so that the masses of the people
can work and live in reasonable comfort. Nations cannot produce on a
level to sustain their people in well-being unless they have reasonable
1992]
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thinkers, and most had experienced first-hand the disastrous conse-
quences of the beggar-thy-neighbor policies of the 1930s and the fruit-
less results of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act.'3 Thus, arguing before a
suspicious Congress that the United States needed to take the initia-
tive in establishing a multilateral trade regime and in reducing trade
barriers, Secretary of State Cordell Hull emphasized the peace-keep-
ing role of these institutions and their contribution to improving the
human condition: "I have never faltered, and I will never falter, in my
belief that enduring peace and the welfare of nations are indissolubly
connected with friendliness, fairness, equality, and the maximum
practicable degree of freedom in international trade,"14 and further
added, "one of the surest safeguards against war is the opportunity of
all peoples to buy and sell on equal terms and without let or hindrance
of a political character."l5
There are several reasons why a harmonious and well-instituted
world trading environment is conducive to peaceful relations. First,
trade itself can contribute to peace through its effect on cultural famil-
iarity and understanding. The ordinary business of trading with for-
eigners requires human interaction and often entails a variety of
endeavors that increase international contact and contribute to the de-
velopment of mutual respect between people of different nationalities.
For example, many governments-as well as states within the United
States-have begun establishing overseas missions to promote their
products.16 It has become increasingly clear that sales to foreign con-
sumers are dependent upon understanding the culture and values of
these consumers and adapting products to meet their needs and
desires. Trade in physical goods is being partially replaced by the
greater willingness of Japanese automakers to build plants in the
United States and the proliferation of joint projects between Western
firms and organizations in the emerging democracies of Eastern Eu-
rope.17 All of these trade-related trends lead to greater human inter-
opportunities to trade with one another. And this cannot happen in a
world of extreme economic barriers, political hostility, and recurring
wars.
See MEMOIRS, supra note 9, at 364.
13. 19 U.S.C. § 1304 (1988).
14. CORDELL Huu, Economic Barriers to Peace 14 (1937) quoted in KENNETH DAM,
THE GATT: LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIc ORGANIZATION 12 n.5 (1970).
15. Sumner Wells, "Address on 'Our Foreign Policy and National Defense' to the
Foreign Affairs Council, Cleveland, September 28, 1940," quoted in DAM, supra
note 14, at 12 n.5.
16. By mid-1985, 33 U.S. states maintained over 60 foreign trade offices in more than
a dozen states. See John M. Kline, A New Federalism for United States Foreign
Policy, 24 ST. POLIcY REP. 3 (1985).
17. According to Dillon, one perspective of the importance of Japanese investments
in the U.S. holds that "Japanese investments in the U.S. and all other types of
foreign investments and trade (including U.S. investments abroad) are breaking
[Vol. 71:460
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action and can be expected to increase tolerance for cultural
differences and improve the odds that international conflicts will be
resolved through non-military means.
In addition, an open trading system leads to gains from trade that
increase the total amount of goods available for the satisfaction of
human material wants.' 8 The greater availability of goods in an open
trading system can help reduce the international tensions that might
arise in a world not replete with resources. However, the existence of
this surplus does not preclude international conflicts stemming from
disagreements over how it is to be shared.19 It is in this context that
rules assuring fair trading practices become critical. If the gains from
trade do not appear to be equitably shared, nations will have little in-
centive to enter the world market and the contribution of the interna-
tional trading system to world peace will be vitiated. Thus, not only
trade itself but also the institutions to equitably govern trading rela-
tions have important peace-keeping functions.
Of course, some might argue that markets, including international
markets, are actually a source of exploitation and conflict rather than
institutions that foster peaceful business relations.20 This is more
down age-old barriers between the countries. In this view, the nation-state, and
within it the role of governments is diminishing in importance as global economic
integration proceeds." See KENNETH J. DILLON, JAPANESE INVESTMENT IN THE
UNrrED STATES 10 (1989).
18. This is the standard gains from trade argument first developed by David Ricardo.
See, e.g., D. SALVATORE, INTERNATIONAL EcONOMIcS (2d ed., 1987).
19. Sharing rules in international agreements are as critical to the success of these
agreements as the creation of surplus. The failure of economic integration efforts
in Africa is due, in part, to difficulties in devising satisfactory sharing rules. See,
e.g., Omotvnde E.G. Johnson, Economic Integration in Afric: Enhancing Pros-
pects for Success, 29 J. MOD. AF. STuD. 1 (1991).
The allegedly 'unfair' gains/losses emanating from differences in levels
of development helps to explain the break-up of the East African Com-
munity, where it was felt by some skeptics that Kenya's industrialization
was greatly helped, but that in the process Tanzania might have been
adversely affected. An attempt to use differential intra-union tariffs-
designated 'transfer taxes'--could not alleviate the problems, at least not
to the satisfaction of Tanzania.
Id. at 9.
20. For an illuminating discussion of alternative views of the civilizing effects of mar-
kets, see Albert 0. Hirschman, Rival Interpretations of Market Society: Civiliz-
ing, Destructive, or Feeble?, 20 J. ECON. LIT. 1463 (1982). Hirschman stated-
Only with regard to international trade was it still asserted from time to
time, usually as an after-thought, that expanding transactions will bring
not only mutual material gains, but also some fine byproducts in the cul-
tural and moral realms, such as intellectual cross-fertilization and mu-
tual understanding and peace. Within the boundaries of the nation, the
expansion of industry and commerce was widely viewed as contributing
to the breakdown of traditional communities and to the loosening and
disintegration of social and effective ties, rather than their consolidation.
Id at 1470-71. Elsewhere, he wrote:
1992]
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likely to be the case when the rules governing the market appear to be
discriminatory or unfair to some of the parties participating in the
market exchange. If this is true, it adds weight to the argument that
rules assuring fair access to international markets are essential for the
realization of both their economic and peace-keeping functions.
Some scholars have argued that the GATT system supplies a pure
public good-a liberal trading system.2 1 As we have argued previ-
ously, the institutional purpose of a liberal trading system is the pro-
motion of world peace. World peace and the liberal trading system
instrumental for the realization of world peace have all the character-
istics of pure public goods. 2 2 Pure public goods are characterized by
non-rivalry in consumption and the impossibility of excluding those
who do not contribute to the provision of the public good. This latter
characteristic leads to the problem of free-riding because self-inter-
ested individuals have little incentive to reveal their true preferences
for the public good. This behavior often has been likened to the pris-
oners' dilemma because, while the sum of individual benefits from the
public good is greater than the sum of individual costs, each individual
has an incentive to defect from the cooperative solution. The best in-
dividual outcome occurs when others behave cooperatively while the
individual defects.
Because all participants in the prisoners' dilemma are assumed to
be rational, they all perceive that defection is the best strategy and the
non-cooperative outcome prevails. Coleman refers to the difference
between the non-cooperative outcome of the prisoners' dilemma and
the pareto optimal outcome as a "capturable cooperative surplus."23 It
one of the fondest hopes expressed in the seedtime of capitalist develop-
ment was that worldwide trade and investment consequent upon capital-
ist development would make war impossible and lay a solid foundation
for peace and friendship among nations. When around the beginning of
the Twentieth Century the illusory nature of this hope became only too
obvious, it was attractive to argue, along exactly opposite lines, that capi-
talism itself inevitably leads to great-power rivalry and war .... But
Schumpeter, writing during World War I, came to the rescue of the ear-
lier optimistic view by arguing that capitalism, in and of itself, could only
lead to peace.
Id- at 1475-76.
21. C. Ford Runge, Harold von Witzke, & Shelley Thompson, Liberal Agricultural
Trade as a Public Good: Free Trade Versus Free Riding Under GATT, Staff Paper
P87-11, Dep't of Agric. and Applied Econ., Univ. of Minn. (1987). See also Kin-
dleberger, supra note 1, at 9 ("In the economic sphere, various international pub-
lic goods have been identified; an open-trading system including freedom of the
seas, well-defined property rights, standards of weights and measures that may
include international money or fixed exchange rates and the like.").
22. Kindleberger also treated world peace as an international public good. "I come at
long last to international public goods. The primary one is peace. Economists are
poorly qualified to discuss how, after war, peace is restored and maintained."
Kindleberger, supra note 1, at 9.
23. JuLES L. COLEMAN, MARKErS, MORALS, AND THE LAw 78 (1988).
[Vol. 71:460
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is only through an enforceable contract that this cooperative surplus
can be captured, and the existence of such contracts requires collective
institutions. For international trade, those collective institutions are
contained in the GATT.
According to the theory of international trade, the move from a
position of autarky to a regime of free trade gives rise to gains from
trade. Those gains can be seen as the cooperative surplus available to
nations participating in world trade. Runge and others have argued
that such gains from trade are a public good that will be provided in
sub-optimal amounts in the absence of mechanisms to coordinate col-
lective behavior.2 4 According to their analysis, the free-rider problem
is an example of an assurance problem. They argue that free-riding
can be overcome if all participants can be assured that others are com-
plying with the rules. In the absence of that assurance, countries are
likely to defect by attempting to take advantage of the free and open
trading system while instituting measures to protect strategic or politi-
cally sensitive industries within the country itself.25
The aforementioned defection is opportunistic. Opportunistic be-
havior occurs when "a performing party behaves contrary to the other
party's understanding of their contract, but not necessarily contrary to
the agreement's explicit terms, leading to a transfer of wealth from
the other party to the performer .... ."26 Opportunism is subtle behav-
ior and, as such, very difficult to police. Having agreed to reductions
in transparent protectionism (tariffs), many governments have ex-
ploited the open-ended character of some of the GATT provisions to
impose a variety of measures and policies in an effort to mitigate the
effects of the tariff reductions.27 Because some of the GATT provi-
sions are open-ended by necessity and design, one might argue that the
root cause of the perceived inadequacy of the GATT framework is the
opportunistic exploitation of the open-texture of the agreement-and
24. See Runge, von Witzke, & Thompson, supra note 21, at 3.
25. Id. at 7.
26. Timothy J. Muris, Opportunistic Behavior and the Law of Contracts, 65 MINN. L.
REv. 521 (1981).
27. For examples of how nations have exploited the open-ended character of the
GAT provisions, see the discussion infra under NTBs, VERs, Safeguards, Devel-
oping Country Exceptions, Federalism Clause and Dispute Settlement. Some-
times, nations also exploit the ambiguity in the language of some GATIT
provisions. A good example is Article XXIV, which deals with "Regional Eco-
nomic Arrangements." As Dam points out,
the effort to attain precision and to force future arrangements into Arti-
cle XXIV's mold proved to be a failure if not a fiasco. Ambiguity rather
than precision reigned. The dismaying experience of the GATT has been
that, with one possible exception, no customs union or free-trade-area
agreement thus far presented for review has complied with Article
XXIV, yet no such agreement has been disapproved.
DAii, supra note 14, at 275-76.
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not the inadequacy of the GATT1 provisions per se. The GATT provi-
sions are effective only to the extent that contracting parties want
them to be.
One might argue with some validity that opportunism in interna-
tional interactions is a fact of life under democratic institutional ar-
rangements. Since the seminal work by Downs and the growing
empirical public choice literature, we have gained a better understand-
ing of the influence that pressure groups and constituencies have on
political and bureaucratic decision making.28 Baldwin has docu-
mented convincingly the myriad of constituencies that have shaped
United States international trade legislation since 1945.29 Constitu-
ency-based legislation is not a monopoly of the United States as the
experiences of the European Community, Japan and other democra-
cies illustrate.
A strand of the public choice literature also identifies as a cause of
opportunistic behavior in international interaction the endogeneous
character of policy decisions by politicians and bureaucrats. For exam-
ple, Vaubel has argued that politicians sometimes relegate to interna-
tional organizations those decisions that have the potential to reduce
their domestic political capital.30 Recently, Marra, Ostrom and Simon
demonstrated empirically that politicians use drama in the interna-
tional arena to bolster their popularity in the domestic market.31 En-
dogeneous policy actions are not restricted to politicians. Within the
framework of the European Community, Messerlin demonstrated that
the bureaucracy has a tendency to oversupply protectionism. 32 In our
own theoretical explorations on the issue of the supply of protection-
ism by the President of the United States and Congress, we suggested
that the indivisibility of foreign policy and foreign trade decisions sup-
ports the granting of wider presidential discretion in international
trade decisions.33 However, presidential discretion is increasingly cir-
cumscribed as international trade legislation is exploited by both poli-
ticians and bureaucrats to gain favor with clients. Thus, the problem
of opportunism in international interactions has a cause or causes that
28. ANTHONY DowNs, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1957). For a review of
the empirical public choice literature and its application to international interac-
tions, see BRuNO S. FREY, INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMICs (1984).
29. ROBERT E. BALDwIN, TRADE POLICY IN A CHANGING WORLD ECONOMY (1988).
30. Roland Vaubel, A Public Choice Approach to International Organization, 51 PuB.
CHOICE 39 (1986).
31. Robin F. Marra, Charles W. Ostrom, Jr., and Dennis M. Simon, Foreign Policy
and Presidential Popularity, 34 J. OF CONFLICT REs. 588 (1990).
32. Paul Messerlin, The Political Economy of Protectionism: The Bureaucratic Case,
WELTwiRTSCHAFrLCHEs ARCHv. BAND 117, HEFT 3, 469 (1981).
33. Fred 0. Boadu & E. Wesley F. Peterson, Enforcing United States Foreign Trade
Legislation: Is There a Need for Expanded Presidential Discretion?, 24 J. WORLD
TRADE L. 79, 83 (1990).
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are firmly rooted in the political culture.34 With this background in
mind, we turn now to some specific examples of the problem of oppor-
tunism in international trade.
1. Non-tariff Barriers to Trade
The abolition of non-tariff trade barriers (NTBs) is arguably the
most contentious issue in modern trade regulation. NTBs include
such quantitative restrictions as import quotas and voluntary export
restraints (VERs), as well as technical or administrative provisions
such as health and safety regulations, standards, licensing, labeling,
documentation requirements and minimum pricing regulations.3 5 Ta-
ble 1 shows the extent of NTBs on selected products in 1984. The ta-
ble shows that both developed and developing countries are actively
involved in using NTBs as a means of excluding imports. The increase
in the number of NTBs took place at the same time that tariffs were
being reduced.
The use of NTBs is a prime example of opportunism in interna-
tional trade. For example, it is often difficult to distinguish between
provisions designed to protect consumers or the environment from
harmful products and those aimed at protecting producers from for-
eign competition. That lack of transparency allows governments
wishing to protect producers to accomplish their objective in the guise
of following the letter of the law.36 In addition, "since NTBs can as-
sume widely varying forms and since in many cases there can be hon-
est disagreement not only on whether a given measure should be
termed an NTB but also on what 'abolition' of that measure should
entail, the GATT has no general provision on NTBs."37 Those factors
make NTBs ideal vehicles for opportunistic behavior.
Although there are no general GATT provisions governing the use
of NTBs or negotiations on their reduction, GATT rules do prohibit
34. Historically, opportunism in international trade was held in check by a hege-
monic power who policed the behavior of other nations. Great Britain was such a
hegemonic power until the World War 11, when the United States assumed the
role. See Yarbrough & Yarbrough, infra note 57. See also Runge, von Witzke &
Thompson, supra note 21, and references therein.
35. See URUGUAY ROUND, supra note 4, at 121.
36. As Malmgren points out, "sometimes the NTBs are intended by governments to
discriminate against foreign trade. At other times the NTBs have come about
unintentionally, often as an outgrowth of some domestic policy decision which
never took the trade impact into account at all." HAROLD B. MALMGREN, TRADE
WARS OR TRADE NEGOTIATIoNs: NON-TARIFF BARRmRs AND ECONOMIC
PEACEKEEING 13 (1970). For examples of conflicts over food regulations within
the European Community, see E. Wesley F. Peterson, Mechel Paggi, & Guy
Henry, Quality Restrictions as Barriers to Trade- The Case of EC Regulations on
the Use of Hormones, 13 W. J. AGRIc. ECON. 82 (1988).
37. DAm, supra note 14, at 19.
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quantitative restrictions.38 The prevalence of VERs, quotas, licenses,
etc., renders the prohibition ineffective in practice. A sampling of the
language used to deal with some other NTBs shows how easy it is for
NTBs to become sources of opportunism. For example, the provisions
on formalities (fees charged for forms, documents, visas, inspections,
etc.) only require nations to limit amounts to the "approximate costs
of services rendered... ."39 The provisions on documentation in trade
only state the "need for decreasing and simplifying import and export
documentation requirements." 40 Part of the "Marks of Origin" rule
only requires nations to avoid making requirements that "unreasona-
bly increase the cost"41 of products, and the provisions on 'health and
sanitary regulations' exempt "measures necessary to protect human,
animal, or plant life or health."42 There are considerable degrees of
freedom in interpreting this particular regulation.43
2. Use of Safeguard Mechanisms
Article XIX of the GATT permits governments to escape from
their GATT obligations and raise trade barriers to safeguard any of
their producers seriously injured by the liberalization of trade.44 The
inherent invitation to abuse the intent of this provision is obvious be-
cause domestic producers are usually interested in trade liberalization
as long as it means access to the other's markets. The original justifi-
cation for the safeguard mechanism was to encourage cautious coun-
tries to enter into a greater number of tariff bindings than would
otherwise be the case.45 One observer has stated that "Article XIX
has rarely, if ever, been interpreted in a way that would appear to be
consistent with the text. Countries have discriminated selectively
against supplying countries in the application of trade barriers,
avoided compensating foreign suppliers adversely affected by their ac-
tions, and stayed out of the limelight of national and international
scrutiny."46 Parties' unwillingness to follow the stringent guidelines
under Article XIX and the increasing political power of domestic pro-
ducer groups and unions suggest that the GATT's safeguard mecha-
nism has been a source of significant opportunism in international
trade.
38. Id. at 150.
39. Id at 181.
40. Id at 183.
41. Id. at 187.
42. Id at 194.
43. For a detailed discussion of some of these health regulation problems, see Peter-
son, Paggi, & Henry, supra note 36.
44. Sampson, Safeguards, in URUGUAY RouND, supra note 4, at 143. Article XIX is
popularly referred to as the 'Escape Clause." See DAM, supra note 14, at 99.
45. See DAM, supra note 14, at 99.
46. See Sampson, supra note 44, at 143.
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3. Developing Country Exceptions and Graduation
Several provisions under the GATT accord different and more
favorable treatment of developing countries. These include provisions
allowing countries to impose quantitative restrictions to protect infant
industries and for balance-of-payments purposes; allowing relief from
obligations to make reciprocal concessions consistent with the most-
favored-nation (MFN) principle; and a preference scheme for develop-
ing country exports under the Generalized System of Preferences
(GSP).47 The GSP scheme envisaged "graduation" for those countries
that, over time, are not classified as developing.48 There is mounting
evidence that developing countries are increasingly using the excep-
tions not for the purposes for which they originally were intended.
For example, due in part to the open-ended nature of the balance-of-
payments exception and a decline in enforcing the Standards of Appli-
cation by the GATT, Hindley has suggested that developing countries
have been able to "adjust their tariffs and impose quantitative restric-
tions almost at will" under the exception. It is also known that coun-
tries have resisted graduation, fearing the losses that might
accompany such an action.4 9 To the extent that GATT's oversight of
developing countries' adherence to the developing country exclusions
is weak, the potential for opportunism will be enhanced and further
weaken the efforts toward building a stable and credible world trade
regime.
47. For a discussion of the different and more favorable treatment of developing
countries under the Uruguay Round of negotiations, see Brian Hindley, Different
and More Favorable Treatment and Graduation, in URUGUAY ROUND, supra note
4, at 67.
48. The GSP legislation came into force under the Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-
618, 88 Stat. 1978 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2461-2465). What consti-
tutes a developing country for GSP purposes is not clear. The United States re-
lies on per capita income measures which "provide[s] for the automatic
graduation from beneficiary status in the GSP of countries with a per capita in-
come greater than $8,500 a year," Hindley, supra note 47, at 73.
49. Hindley, supra note 47, at 73. GATT often seems not to be informed of tariffs or
QRs applied by developing countries on balance-of-payments grounds. The re-
ports of countries that do not notify GATT about trade restrictions used for bal-
ance-of-payments purposes suggest that the restrictions are often applied to only
a small fraction of imports. Since trade restrictions genuinely used for balance-
of-payments purposes are likely to be across-the-board, this strongly suggests that
the notified trade restrictions are being used for some other purpose." Id. at 68.
In the same paper, the author discusses the rejection of the graduation idea by
developing countries. For example, the Group of 77 rejects the concept of 'gradu-
ation' sought to be introduced by developed countries to discriminate among de-
veloping countries in a unilateral and arbitrary manner. Id. at 72. For a recent
example of the resistance to the removal of trade benefits, see Walter S. Moss-
berg, U.S. Removal of Trade Benefits is Tied to Currency Rates of Four Asian
Nations, WALL ST. J., Feb. 1, 1988, at 4. (The four countries were South Korea,
Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong. Representatives from these countries vigor-
ously protested the removal of trade benefits).
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4. The Federalism Clause
GATT Article XXIV:12 recognizes the difficulties facing parties
with federal structures of government in complying with the non-dis-
crimination provisions under Article M. In an effort to deal with the
federalism problem, however, the drafters left room for opportunism.
Article XXIV:12 states: "Each contracting party shall take such rea-
sonable measures as may be available to it to ensure observance of the
provisions of this Agreement by the regional and local governments
and authorities within its territory."50
In countries such as the United States, where the Constitution
reserves some areas of regulation to the component states, reasonable
measures may not be defined easily and the potential for state oppor-
tunism is enhanced.51 This is especially true because the interpreta-
tive note to the Article attempts to distinguish between those actions
by component units of a federation related to the "letter" and not the
"spirit" of the clause.5 2
5. Dispute Resolution Mechanism
The dispute resolution mechanism in any agreement is one way to
gauge the intentions of the parties towards maintaining their relation-
ships over time.53 One approach to dispute settlement is "power-ori-
ented."5 4 Where the instrument for dispute settlement is power-
oriented, the powerful party forces the settlement terms on the
weaker party. It has been suggested, for example, that the EC follows
a primarily more power-oriented approach in its international trade
50. For a detailed discussion of the Federalism Clause under the GATT, see John H.
Jackson, The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in United States Domestic
Law, 66 Mmn. L. REv. 250 (1967).
51. Fred Boadu, Fred J. Ruppel, & E. Wesley F. Peterson, Federalism, Opportunism,
and Multilateral Trade Negotiations in Agriculture, 73 Am. J. OF AGRic. ECON.
1009-19 (1991).
52. See DAM, supra note 14, at 128 (In dealing with local level discriminatory tax
statutes that are "inconsistent" with the letter but not the spirit of Article I, the
central government is not required to "repeal ... existing national legislation
authorizing local governments to impose internal taxes ... if such repeal would
result in a serious financial hardship for the local governments or authorities
concerned").
53. See, eg., RICHARD B. BiNDER, MANAGING THE RISKS OF INTERNATIONAL AGREE.
MENT 56 (1981); Ian R. MacNeil, The Many Futures of Contract, 47 So. CAL. L.
REv. 691 (1974); Ian R. MacNeil, Adjustments of Long-Term Economic Relations
Under Classical, Neoclassica4 and Relational Contract Law, 72 Nw. U. L. REV.
854 (1978).
54. Ivo Van Bael, The GATT Dispute Settlement Procedure, 22 J. WORLD TRADE L. 4
(1988). For futher discussion of the 'power-oriented' versus 'rule-oriented' ap-
proaches to dispute settlement, see JOHN H. JACKSON, REsTRucruRING THE
GATT SYSTEM (1990).
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relations.5 5 Another route often advocated by developing countries is
the "rule-oriented" approach to dispute settlement. Neither approach
directly eliminates opportunism because both plaintiff and defendant
countries may sit on the dispute resolution panels. Under the GATT
practice of consensus decisionmaking, either party may prevent a
GATT ruling from taking effect.5 6
The lack of provisions to regulate the use of NTBs, the safeguard
mechanism, and the other measures described above open the possibil-
ity for opportunism by countries that belong to the GATT. Opportu-
nistic behavior undermines the world trading system because it leads
to the perception that some countries are capturing more than their
fair share of the cooperative surplus. That perception can give rise to
further defections (for instance, the introduction of agricultural ex-
port subsidies by the United States as a response to the perception that
the EC was unfairly subsidizing its farmers) and a general deteriora-
tion of the trading environment. Under those circumstances, the
world trading system is no longer able to realize its functions of gener-
ating an economic surplus and promoting world peace. The problem
here is not with the multilateral approach, but rather with the incen-
tives to defect engendered by an incomplete set of rules and open-
ended regulations.
III. TOWARD A MORE EFFECTIVE ROLE FOR THE GATT
The GATT arrangement has come under attack in recent years.
Some have called for major reforms of the system while others have
insisted on an outright dismantling of the GATT with more responsive
institutional arrangements put in its place. In this section of the arti-
cle, we discuss in some detail the various kinds of institutions that
have been suggested as alternative paths to organizing world trade so
as to further the institutional goal of a peaceful world. We focus pri-
marily on the macro-institutional arrangements-multilateralism, bi-
lateralism, and regional arrangements, as opposed to the micro-
institutions and concepts such as reciprocity, issue linkage and hostage
trading.57 The primary interest in this discussion is to assess how the
suggested alternatives address the fundamental problems of interna-
55. Van Bael, supra note 54, at 75.
56. Id at 73. Even though nations have the option under the GATT rules to prevent
a ruling from taking effect, the authority has been rarely used.
57. For a view advocating the substitution of these micro-institutional arrangements
for the GATT multilateral system, see Beth V. Yarbrough & Robert M. Yar-
brough, Reciprocity, Bilateralism, and Economic Hostages: SeUEnforcing Agree-
ments in International Trade, 30 INT. STUD. QUART. 7 (1986); Beth V. Yarbrough
& Robert M. Yarbrough, Institutions for the Governance of Opportunism in In-
ternational Trade, 3 J. OF L. ECON. AND ORG. 1 (1987); Beth V. Yarbrough &
Robert M. Yarbrough, Free Trade, Hegemony, and the Theory of Agency, 38
KYKLos 348 (1985).
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tional trade institutions so as to move the world toward the goal of
peaceful coexistence.
A. Bilateralism
Bilateral agreements have been described as a two-country con-
tract.5 8 Bilateral arrangements cover one or more aspects of the trade
relations between two countries. One example is the bilateral agree-
ment on trade in grains and oilseeds that the United States has with
the former USSR. The agreement was established in the late 1970s in
response to the perception in the United States that sporadic and un-
predictable Soviet grain purchases were disrupting United States
grain markets.5 9 Under this arrangement, upper and lower bounds on
Soviet grain purchases were established. Other bilateral agreements
include the United States-Japanese agreement on beef trade, the
USSR-Cuba sugar arrangements, and many more.
The existence of a great many bilateral agreements can lead to in-
creased instability on world markets. The reason for this is that the
greater the amounts of a given commodity traded under bilateral
agreements, the smaller will be the volume traded on the residual
world market. Small markets, often referred to as thin or illiquid
markets, are less stable because relatively small shocks will have a
substantial impact on prices. These are precisely the conditions that
obtain on the world sugar market, which has been characterized in
recent years by extreme price instability. Because of the instability, a
world trade regime based on bilateral agreements will not generate as
large a cooperative surplus as one organized around multilateral
institutions.
In addition, bilateral agreements are discriminatory, meaning that
access to the cooperative surplus generated is not open to all countries.
A further disadvantage is that the arrangements are negotiated by
governments, such that there is a potential for each government to
attempt to act as monopolist. The behavior of bilateral monopolists is
expected to be non-cooperative because each side is aware that the
other has some ability to use the relationship to advance its interests
at the expense of the other country. That can lead to distrust of the
bilateral partner as well as discrimination against the third parties.
In practical terms, a world trade regime based on bilateral agree-
ments could be extremely confusing for traders because they would be
forced to deal with many sets of institutional arrangements in order to
trade with more than a few countries. That would raise the transac-
58. Judd Polk & Gardner Patterson, The Emerging Pattern of Bilateralism, 62
QUART. J. ECON. 118 (1947).
59. See Leo V. Mayer, The Russian Grain Agreement of 1975 and The Future United
States Food Policy, 7 U. TOL. L. REv. 1031 (1976). See also, ANDREW SCHMriZ,
GRAIN EXPORT CARTEis 5-9 (1981).
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tions costs of carrying out international trade, further reducing the
cooperative surplus generated by the trading system. The reduction in
the cooperative surplus, as well as the discriminatory nature of bilat-
eral agreements, means that world trade and the institutions to govern
it are less likely to contribute to world peace. It should be noted that
the rationale for bilateral agreements is almost always based on a vi-
sion of narrow, national interest, and this nationalistic perspective is
not conducive to world peace.
Several scholars have made distinctions between bilateralism as
practiced by dictatorial regimes and the practice under Western demo-
cratic institutions. For example, pre-war Central European bilateral-
ism under German leadership has been condemned on both political
and economic grounds as "exploitative and opportunistic."60 Simi-
larly, the CVIEA arrangement between Eastern European countries
contains seeds of exploitation and opportunism by the dominant
power, the Soviet Union. Faced with possible disintegration of the en-
tire CMEA arrangement, the Soviet Union seems to be the only part-
ner capable of capturing opportunistic rents from the relationship, "as
the Soviet Union can more easily divert the bulk of its exports to
Western markets than can the Six, and as it does not depend on sup-
plies from any single country among the Six, while each of the Six is
highly dependent upon the Soviet Union, it seems to be in an inher-
ently strong bargaining position."61
The history of bilateralism in Western capitalist countries shows
that it has never been intended to be a permanent feature of trade
policy. As Brabant puts it, "in the market-type economies, the bilat-
eral trade policy is usually conceived as a transitional trade mecha-
nism for bridging rather important disturbances in the international
economy (such as war, depression, revolution, payments crises,
etc.)." 62 Post-war Western European bilateralism was intended to
deal precisely with a crisis--an acute shortage of convertible currency
brought about by war financing. Bilateralism in Europe was not in-
tended to function as "a competitive alternative to Bretton Woods and
was not recognized as such by its members."63 Even in its limited
form, the United States protested the formation of bilateral arrange-
ments between countries, seeing these arrangements as "inconsistent
with multilateralism, the prime objective of United States interna-
tional economic policy."64
Bilateralism promotes a limited vision of the world. The agree-
60. See Polk & Patterson supra, note 58.
61. Martin Schrenk, Whither Comecon?, 27 FiN. AND DEv. 27, 31 (1990).
62. JoZEF M. VAN BRABANT, BILATERALisM AND STRUCTURAL BILATERALISM 3
(1973).
63. Polk & Patterson, supra note 58, at 142. (Emphasis added).
64. Id. at 188.
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ments have the potential to increase tensions in international trade
and restrict domestic political freedoms. International tensions are in-
creased because bilateralism reduces specialization, inhibits interna-
tional division of labor and poses difficulties in integrating into a
multilateral world.65 The approach restricts domestic political free-
doms because it increases bureaucracy and the creation of stringent
governmental controls. In those situations where bilateralism has
been regarded as a permanent trade policy-pre-war Central Europe
and the post-war CMEA countries-bilateralism has been found to
lead to exploitative opportunism by a dominant country. In the West-
ern countries, bilateralism has never been accorded the status of a per-
manent international trade strategy, a far cry from the recent calls for
such a plan of attack.
B. Regional Agreements
Regionalism refers to the construction of free trade areas, customs
unions or sectorial agreements.66 In recent years, there has been a
renewed interest in this strategy as a substitute for the GATT multi-
lateral system. Some of the recent initiatives moving the world to-
wards regional trading blocks include plans for a unified market in the
European Community in 1992, the United States-Canada Agreement
in 1989, the movements towards a United States-Canada-Mexico free
trade agreement, the possibility of an ASEAN-inspired free trade area
led by Japan, a possible Pacific Basin arrangement, and the recent
Abuja declaration by sub-Saharan Africa governments.67
Economic literature on international trade and customs unions
shows that the theoretical welfare effects of forming trading blocks
are ambiguous in contrast to the effects of establishing a free and open
trading system that generates an unambiguous cooperative surplus. It
may be that allowing free trade within a region would be preferable to
a mercantilist world of protectionism and trade barriers. But such an
approach is inferior to generalized free trade. In the language of eco-
nomics, regional trading blocks are "second best" and can be expected
to generate a smaller cooperative surplus than a more inclusive, open
trading system.
Regional Trading Blocs contrast the characteristics of the GATT
multilateral system with those of regional trading blocks (see Chart
1). They point out that the GATT multilateral system is based on a
principle of non-discrimination through the most-favored-nation
65. VAN BRABANT, supra note 62, at 3.
66. REGIONAL TRADING BLocs, supra note 5, at 1.
67. The least known regional proposal is the recent declaration by the 51-member
states of the Organization of African Unity to establish an African Economic
Community within a period of 34 years. See 28 ASR. RES. BULL. (Political Series)
6, 10154 (1991).
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CHART 1
A COMPARISON OF THE PRINCIPLES AND CHARACTERISTICS
OF THE GATT AND THE REGIONAL TRADING BLOC MODEL
GATT Principles and
Characteristics
(1) Trade is based on the principle of
nondiscrimination.
(2) All members are bound to grant as
favorable treatment to each other as
they give to any other member (i.e.,
most-favored-nation status).
(3) To the maximum extent possible,
protection should be provided only
through tariffs.
(4) Basic ideas include economic
liberalism and free trade based on
comparative advantage.
(5) The system is designed as a
community open to all who are
willing to follow membership rules.
(6) The goal is to build a unified and
integrated global system.
(7) Under Article XXIV, the system
provides a three-part test to
determine if a regional trading bloc
is consistent with the GAIT.
Regional Trading Bloc Principles
and Characteristics
(1) Trade is based on the principle of
discrimination.
(2) Nations within the bloc share
special preferences not granted to
nations outside the bloc.
(3) Protection is often provided through
quantitative restrictions as well as
tariffs.
(4) Basic ideas include economic
nationalism, or regionalism,
bilateralism, and trade often based
on strategic trade theory and
neomercantilism.
(5) The bloc may not be open to all
who wish to join and are willing to
follow membership rules.
(6) The bloc may function as an
exclusive club that generates a
"them versus us" psychology.
(7) In the view of some advocates,
blocs are a way of building a
stronger multilateral system in the
long run.
Source: Belous and Hartley, p. 3.
provision, while regional trading
discriminatory.
blocks are fundamentally
A regional agreement involves one in which the parties treat each
other differently than they treat third parties. The inherent discrimi-
nation means that a world trading system grounded on regional agree-
ments would not assure fair and equal access to the cooperative
surplus that is essential for the provision of the public goods of a har-
monious trading environment and world peace.
Regional Trading Blocs also note that the multilateral system is
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open to all countries willing to follow membership rules. This is in
stark contrast to regional trading blocks, which tend to be exclusive
rather than inclusive. We have used the economic theory of clubs to
analyze regional trade agreements. We have found that there are good
theoretical reasons to expect that there will be an optimal number of
members of these trading blocks, and that this number will be less
than the number of potential applicants. 68 Supporting this theoretical
result is the current resistence of the EC to further enlargement to
include the new democracies of Eastern Europe. As pointed out else-
where, trading blocks that refuse to accept new members willing to
abide by the rules are probably "building an income-destroying trade
block by order of domestic lobbies"69 rather than expanding the world
trading system.
The implication is that regional trading blocks are not likely to be
effective vehicles for achieving the vision of a peaceful world. That
conclusion is supported by an examination of the origin and history of
regionalism in world trade. Almost invariably, regionalism has gener-
ated enthusiasm only when a hegemon concludes that it is no longer
capable of dictating the terms of trade within a multilateral frame-
work, and that its influence would be felt the most in a smaller, re-
gional framework. Thus, for example, the British ardently supported
internationalism between 1850 and 1928 because Great Britain was a
major industrial, financial and investment center. The Stock Market
Crash of 1929 and the ensuing Depression led to declines in American
private investments abroad (especially in Great Britain) and the aban-
donment of the gold standard that supported British internationalism.
By the end of World War II, the British policy of liberal economic in-
ternationalism was virtually abandoned in favor of regionalism. The
focus of British policy shifted to Europe and the Commonwealth (the
Sterling area), the United States focused on the dollar area, and
France and Belgium dealt primarily with their overseas territories.
British interest in pushing the vision of a peaceful world within a mul-
tilateral framework was virtually abandoned.70
In a real sense, the United States and Britain traded places after
1945. The United States emerged from the Second World War as the
undisputed political and economic leader of the world. Predictably,
the United States championed the movement for a multilateral world
political and economic adjustment program. The formation of the In-
68. E. Wesley F. Peterson & Fred 0. Boadu, Agricultural Trade and Regional Agree-
ments (paper presented at the meeting of the International Association of Agri-
cultural Economists, Tokyo, Japan, Aug. 21-30, 1991).
69. THE ECONOMLSr (Apr. 20, 1991) at 12.
70. ERiK THORBECKE, THE TENDENCY ToWARDs REGIONALIZATION IN INTERNATIONAL
TRADE. 1928-1956 (1960). Thorbecke's book provides one of the most authorita-
tive historical accounts of the evolution of regionalism. This section of our paper
summarizes that history.
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ternational Monetary Fund (to facilitate exchange rates alignment
and balance-of-payments management), the World Bank (to finance
economic development projects), the GATT (to liberalize trade), and
the United Nations and its agencies (to address economic, social and
political matters) were all under United States' leadership. United
States' policy during this period was largely opposed to regionalism
and bilateralism.
New political and economic realities arose after 1960. New nations
emerged and membership in the Bretton Woods institutions expanded
with the independence of former British and French colonies. The
membership increases in the organizations brought new pressures and
also increased the cost of decisionmaking within the organizations. By
mid-1970, new economic powers-Japan, the newly industrialized
countries (NICs), and Germany-began to emerge, and the dominant
role of the United States as the world's economic leader was dimin-
ished. On the domestic front, mounting budget and trade deficits in-
creased the pressures on legislators to supply protectionism. United
States' trade deficits were blamed, in part, on the open-market-access
policies that supported the world multilateral trade regime and on the
failure of United States competitors to reciprocate with equal-market-
access policies.71 Regional accords became an attractive alternative to
the multilateral framework that has governed world trade for more
than a quarter of a century.
This short history of regionalism reveals the inadequacies and
threats to a harmonious world trade regime inherent in the policy.
Regionalism is attractive when nations perceive a threat to their na-
tional interests as a result of their participation in a multilateral trad-
ing environment. Regionalism has never been an attractive
alternative for promoting world peace through the establishment of a
harmonious set of rules within a multilateral context. Some have ar-
gued that regional trading blocks can serve as stepping stones on the
way to free and open trade. The problem with that argument is that
there is neither a theory nor an empirical precedent for the transition
from trading blocks to broad trade regimes. And it is difficult to see
how such a transition would be accomplished. Regional policies, in
contrast to a multilateral policy, are cyclical and heavily influenced by
domestic interests who see the regional arrangement as a way to in-
crease bargaining power in trade negotiations. If domestic interest
groups perceive real advantages in regional arrangements, one would
be hardpressed to argue that these regional arrangements could be
71. The increasingly restrictive U.S. trade legislation since the mid-1970s, culminat-
ing in the adoption of Super 301 under the Omnibus Trade and Competitive Act
of 1988, has been explained by the failure of other countries to open up their
markets to U.S. exports.
[Vol. 71:460
WORLD VISIONS
used as levers to push the world towards a multilateral trade arrange-
ment and, in effect, promote the vision of a peaceful world.
C. The GATT Multilateral Framework
In contrast to the bilateral and regional approaches discussed
above, the multilateral agreement embodied in the GATT addresses
the vision of a peaceful world. Multilateral approaches to world trade
are based on such concepts as the most-favored-nation clause, which
prevents discrimination against any particular country or set of coun-
tries. The GATT also is inclusive in that all nations willing to observe
the GATT rules can join the agreement. Such an approach differs
from bilateral arrangements and most regional agreements, which
tend to regulate specific aspects of world trade with no effort to in-
clude third parties. The broad rules associated with the GATT multi-
lateral approach apply equally to all countries, which leads to greater
participation, a larger cooperative surplus and more stable markets.
Conceptually, the multilateral approach emphasizes the potential
gains that can be realized by all participants in the world trading sys-
tem. In contrast, the aforementioned alternatives involve the pursuit
of narrow, national interests in a confrontational context where the
gains on one side are seen as losses to some other party. Clearly, a
smoothly-functioning, multilateral trading system is preferable to any
of the alternatives presently under discussion.
The present problem with the GATT is that negotiators have lost
sight of the true purpose of the agreement-a peaceful world. By fo-
cusing exclusively on how narrow national interests will be affected
by multilateral agreements, the MTN loses its global vision of peace
and becomes a rancorous, nationalistic contest to see which countries
can "win" by making the fewest "concessions". 72 This is the defection
problem that encourages opportunistic behavior in international rela-
tions. The defection problem seems to be of recent origin. As William
Kelly explains, "the spirit of cooperation among wartime allies helped
them to meet the challenges of trade and economic reconstruction.
The cooperative spirit has been overwhelmed by a competitive strug-
gle for exports in a world where many markets are shrinking rather
than expanding."73 The cooperative spirit can be recaptured by re-
emphasizing the purpose and vision of the GATT. The next section
discusses how that vision can be made effective.
72. PER B. KENEN, THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY 232 (1985).
73. William B. Kelly, Functioning of the GA2Y System, in URUGUAY ROUND, supra
note 4, at 81.
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IV. NON-SUBSTANTIVE RULES AS SOLUTIONS
TO DEFECTION
Multilateral arrangements are preferable to regionalism and bilat-
eralism, but the current multilateral system is plagued by opportu-
nism and non-cooperative behavior. To obtain the full advantages of a
multilateral regime, some institutional mechanism to control opportu-
nistic defection is needed. Because there is no international govern-
ment to set up a police force that could arrest governments that cheat,
it is necessary to rely on "non-substantive rules."
Non-substantive rules are not easily defined. Their origin has been
attributed to Bentham, who invented the term to describe "the bodies
of principles and rules of law other than the substantive law; those
dealing not with the rights and duties of persons, but with the means
whereby those rights and duties may be declared, vindicated, or en-
forced, or remedies for their infraction secured... ."74 Non-substan-
tive rules of contract play a gap-filling role in helping parties to an
agreement realize the full benefits of their bargain. Because it is usu-
ally not possible to predict all future occurrences and reduce agree-
ments to completely-specified rules, parties use non-substantive rules
to fill gaps in their agreements.75 The rules are especially important
in the context of international agreements, where the long-term na-
ture and the difficulties in finding language that satisfies the aspira-
tions of a heterogeneous group of nations and cultures demand that
nations adhere toflexibie principles with a goal in view to let an agree-
ment work. Where parties exploit the flexibility in the non-substan-
tive rule or fail to recognize the aspirational goals of the rules,
defection from the cooperative effort and opportunism results.
The concept of "good faith" is one such non-substantive rule.76 In
both domestic and international law, the concept of good faith per-
forms a gap-filling role and, more importantly, deals with the problem
of opportunistic behavior. In United States commercial law, for exam-
ple, a duty of good faith and fair dealing is an essential element of the
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) and the common law: "Every con-
tract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation of good faith in its
performance or enforcement." 77 The Seventh Circuit recently ex-
plained that good faith provisions in contracts are intended to check
opportunism: "Good faith is a compact reference to an implied under-
74. DAVID M. WALKER, THE OxFORD COMPANION To LAW (1980).
75. In the two studies by MacNeil, supra note 53, the author discusses several "gap-
filling" mechanisms in modern contract law. See also Charles J.G. Goetz & Rob-
ert E.S. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REv. 1089 (1981).
76. Isaak Dore & James E. Defranco, A Comparison of the Non-Substantive Provi-
sions of the UNCITRAL Convention on the International Sale of Goods and the
Uniform Commercial Code, 23 HARV. INT'L L.J. 49 (1982).
77. U.C.C. § 1-203. See also references in Dore & Defranco, supra note 76.
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taking not to take opportunistic advantage in a way that could not
have been contemplated at the time of drafting, and which therefore
was not resolved explicitly by the parties. When the contract is silent,
principles of good faith-such as the UCC's standard of honesty in
fact, and the reasonable expectation of the trade... fill the gap."7 8
Today, the principle of good faith is a firm component of contract law
as practiced in most common law countries and continental systems
(e.g., the Swiss, German, and French).79
As one might expect, the extension of good faith principles to the
international arena is not simple. Cultures differ and so does the
meaning of concepts such as fair dealing and good faith. However, a
review of the public international law literature reveals that the con-
cept is not unknown in international interactions. Lord McNair ac-
knowledges the application of the concept to check opportunism in the
performance of international beliefs:
The performance of treaties is subject to an overriding obligation of mutual
good faith. This obligation is also operative in the sphere of interpretation of
treaties and it would be a breach of this obligation for a party to make use of
an ambiguity in order to put forward an interpretation which it was known
to the negotiators of the treaty not to be the intentions of the parties.8 0
The good faith principle has become a part of recent efforts to formu-
late uniform rules governing international trade. The United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) "employed
good faith as a general guiding principle" 81 in formulating uniform
rules concerning international sale of goods. Article 7(1) of the U.N.
Convention on the Contracts for the International Sale of Goods
(CISG) states, "In the interpretation of this convention, regard is to be
had to its international character and to the need to promote uniform-
ity in its application and the observance of good faith in international
trade."
Even though the ultimate substantive goal in employing good faith
principles in all international agreements is the same-to check op-
portunism-the procedural requirements differ depending on whether
one is dealing with a code such as the CISG or with the GATT, which
is merely a voluntary association of nations making decisions by con-
sensus. The major procedural difference is that the good faith princi-
ples in an international code are enforceable in a domestic court of
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law. The court is usually determined by the choice of law rules also
included in the code.8 2 The decisions rendered by the chosen court are
binding.
The difficulties associated with enforcing principles of good faith in
a forum such as the GATT have led some commentators to express
doubts as to the utility of these principles in the international arena.
For example, Zoller has argued that:
There is no juridical obligation of good faith in international law. Good faith
might only be a veritable juridical principle if a normative and positive con-
tent could be attributed to it. Independent of its utilization as a criterion of
interpretation by the international judge, the true juridical context of good
faith is only erroneous belief.
8 3
Virally, who reviewed Zoller's book, considers good faith more than a
mere moral concept. As he puts it, "It refers also, as [Zoller] admits, to
rules of behavior. In particular, good faith requires that the expressed
will be consistent with the real will and, more generally, that the legal
reality be consistent with what it seems to be (that is, consistent with
the appearances created by the declarations or the behavior of legal
actors). Good faith excludes any separation between reality and ap-
pearances." 84 In the context of an agreement such as the GATT,
Virally is on point: "Good faith is essential to a nonformalistic order,
which allows the most room for the creation and performance of law
by the will of those who are submitted to it, and does not possess any
system of enforcement independent of this will."85 Using similar ar-
guments, Cassese in a recent book points out:
The principle of good faith is intended to 'invade' the penumbra of discretion
left by international rules and guide the conduct of states (and other interna-
tional subjects) in applying norms. While states are enjoined by the general
norms, known as consuetudo est servanda (customary rules must be observed)
and pacta sund servanda (treaties must be complied with), to fulfill these du-
ties, the principle in hand prescribes how to carry out the performance of such
duties. The principle does not specify how states must behave but merely con-
veys the idea that international subjects must not take advantage of their
rights (or discharge their obligations) in such a way as to thwart the purpose
and object of legal rules. States must not betray the expectation created in
other states by those rules, nor must they stultify by their behavior the confi-
dence which the relevant norms have given to their fellow states.8 6
What emerges from the Virally and Cassese arguments is that good
faith may be an effective mechanism for dislodging opportunism in
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international interaction. It imposes a burden on participants in an
international agreement such as the GATT to act such that "the ex-
pressed will be consistent with the real will." This consistency lessens
the likelihood that nations will perceive the cooperative surplus to be
unfairly and unequally distributed, perceptions which are often the
basis for defection. Incorporating non-substantive rules into the body
of international institutions can improve the chances of realizing the
vision of a peaceful world. It is neither necessary nor desirable to cast
the concept of good faith as an iron law of international obligation, for
that would undermine its own usefulness. The issue is to determine
how non-substantive rules such as good faith can be made part of in-
ternational behavior. As a preliminary answer to this complex prob-
lem, we offer the following initial experiments:
* Governments should let the commitment to internationally-negoti-
ated agreements reflect more effectively in domestic legislation. In
addition, governments should set up mechanisms to ensure that
commitments are followed. For example, the United States Con-
gress committed the United States, by legislation, to abide by all fi-
nal decisions of GATT panels. This was not a decision made by the
Executive Branch of Government in furtherance of United States
foreign policy objectives; it was a decision made by the Congress of
the people as a commitment to obey the letter and spirit of interna-
tional rules. Recent United States actions in rejecting GATT panel
decisions send contradictory signals as to the value of the commit-
ment enshrined in the legislation. Nations may want to follow the
United States by drafting similar legislation, and more importantly,
follow what has been laid down in the legislation.
" Another way of extending good faith to the international arena is by
setting up what has been called domestic "transparency agencies."8 7
The goal of such an agency is to "provide an overview of government
intervention;" that is, "to help the government and the public see
sectoral proposals in an economy-wide framework."88 The agency
would be an impartial judge that responds to both the narrow inter-
ests of pressure groups and the broader societal interests to promote
international peace and harmony through the operation of fair and
enforceable international trade rules.
" The desire to extend good faith to the international arena also calls
into question the role and contribution of purveyors of information,
especially the academic community. The difficulty in extending
good faith to the international arena suggests that scholars should
respond with a higher sense of commitment to world peace. Consid-
erable energy has been expended on efforts to simply admit the
existence of bilateral and regional arrangements. Very little effort
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is devoted to showing that a multilateral framework would contrib-
ute to world peace.
* There should be efforts aimed at encouraging bilateral and regional
arrangements to admit new members under the same terms and
conditions of participating countries. This would be an important
test of whether the arrangements seek to ultimately contribute to a
multilateral world.
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In this article, concepts drawn from the literature on the political
economy of international trade have been used in conjunction with
ideas from work on international organizations to examine the nature
and consequences of three competing regimes for regulating interna-
tional trade: bilateralism, regionalism and multilateralism as defined
by the GATT rules. A principal vision and goal of the international
trade regime was identified as the attainment of world peace based on
harmonious world trade rules. It was argued that the inherently dis-
criminatory and nationalistic orientation of bilateralism and regional-
ism led to a reduced specialization and, ultimately, to reduced
capturable surplus from trade. Tensions are more likely to arise as
nations struggle to grab a share of a small surplus. Furthermore, his-
torical evidence shows that where bilateralism and regionalism have
been used as permanent international trade strategies, opportunistic
exploitation has resulted and individual freedoms have suffered.
Thus, bilateralism and regionalism as international trade regimes do
not promote the vision of a peaceful world.
It was argued that the GATT's multilateral framework has the po-
tential to lead nations to a peaceful world by making possible the gen-
eration of a large capturable surplus from trade. However, since the
output of the multilateral framework-world peace based on a harmo-
nious set of rules is an international public good-nations have an in-
centive to defect. The defection is opportunistic in that nations often
violate the spirit, even if not the letter, of the GATT rules. Opportu-
nistic behavior takes the form of, to name a few, the imposition of non-
tariff barriers, misuse of the safeguard clauses, abuse of the developing
country exceptions, the federalism clause, and the dispute resolution
mechanism.
We have argued in this article that the use of non-substantive rules
such as good faith may provide a means for controlling opportunism,
thereby allowing the multilateral approach embodied in the GATT to
provide the institutions that would allow world trade to promote a vi-
sion of a peaceful world. Operationalizing this suggestion is not a sim-
ple matter, and there is great need for further scholarly debate and
discussion to refine the issues and develop institutional innovations
that accomplish the task. This is a particularly important responsibil-
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ity of the community of scholars because they are the only ones who
can reasonably claim to speak from a position of relative neutrality.
Part of the rancor of the current discussions stems from the fact that
it is being conducted almost exclusively by politicians and interest
groups intent on pursuing narrow, self-interested strategies that do
not reflect broader societal interests. In this setting, the only way for
those societal interests to be heard is through the wide diffusion of
scholarly argument on their behalf.
